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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UERALD J. CREASON ai1d VIOLA M. 
CHEASON, aud HALLMARK CON-
S11HUCTORIS, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
ARN'!' LEROY PE'rERSON and RUBY 




BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATE.MEN'l1 OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for breach of 
the covenants of a Utah statutory form of warranty 
deed. 
DJiSPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment for 
the plaintiffs-respondents for $720.00 attorney's fees, 
def endan ts-a<ppcllants appeal. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in their favor that none of the covenants were 
broken, or if they 'rnre broken there was no recoverable 
damage sustained by respondents. If appellants are not 
entitled to that relief, appellants seek reduction of the 
attorney's fees to a reasonable amount for the actual 
services performed by respondents' attorney. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 20, 1963, the respondents traded ap-
pellants a new house which respondents had built at 5075 
-Wesley Road, Salt Lake County, Utah, for an older 
house and lot owned by appellants fronting on the East 
side of 9th East at 5551 South, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
It is the latter property which is the subject of this law 
suit, and which ·will hereinafter be referred to as the 
"subject property". Conveyance from appellants to 
respondents was by a Utah statutory form of warranty 
deed. (Exhibit P-2). The subject property was fenced 
on all four sides and the respondent, Gerald Creason, 
testified he thought he was purchasing the property 
within the fence lines. (R.58) The property lies in the 
Northwest eorner of a 13 acre tract formerly owned by 
Joseph Thompson, who had acquired it from the paten-
tee, -William \Vootton, in 1875. (See abstract, Exhibit 
D-7, Pag·e 2, and copy of deed stapled to back cover). 























( 13.25 chs. 7 
Jn the warranty deed from appellants to respondents 
the :,,;tarti11g point of the :,,;uhject property was described 
as: 
'' Begiuniug at a point in the center of 9th East 
Street, Nor th 9.2 chains from the intersection of 
the center lines of 9th East Street and 56th South 
said point being 13.25 chains West and 9.2 
chains North from the Southeast corner of the 
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of 
Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
I ,ake l\f eridiau. '' 
'l'hi:,,; :,;tarting point, "North 9.2 chains from the iuter-
sertiou ... '' of said streets has heen referred to in all 
the deeds aud other instrnments in the chain title from 
1875 to the present time. Untii 1943, when the appellants 
3 
acquired the property, this starting po·int was always 
specified in all the deeds and other instruments to be 
in line with an old fence, ·which fence was also described 
as being the North line of the subject property. There 
are 13 deeds and other instruments with this reference 
to the old fence. (Pages 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 
22 and 26 of abstract) 
After acquiring the subject property from the appel-
lants, respondents re-sold it to the Sievert·s Brothers. 
Thereafter, SieYerts raised the question with respon-
dents whether the old line of fence which ran along 
the orth side of the property was the true deed line. 
A survey was made by Coon & King and from that sur-
vey two plats were prepared by them, both of which were 
int11oduced into evidence at the trial. The first survey 
plat made by Coon & King (Exhibit P-4) showed that 
both the starting point of the deed description (which is 
at the Northwest corner of the subject property) and 
the North deed line were 6.5 feet North of the old fence 
line and int10 property owned by Arion Erekson. The 
second plat (Exhibit P-3) which was also made by Coon 
& King after Bush & Gudgell had discovered an error in 
their first plat, showed the deed line to be 4.5 feet North 
of the fence. The latter plat ( P-3) showed the fence on 
the South of the property fo be South of the deed line 
about the same or a greater distance as the discrepancy 
on the North, except at the frontage. The rear or East 
fence was shown to be between 2 and 3 feet beyond the 
East deed line. It was undisputed that Exhibit P-3 showed 
39,561 square feet to be encliosed by the fences, whereas 
4 
there were only :38,874 square feet enclosed by the deed 
line . 
Hespondent Crea:,;on testified that he requested per-
mission from Arion Erekson to move the old fence line 
North to one of the survey line:,;, but Erekson refused 
( R.66) be ca u:,;e the ol<l fence had stood in the same plaee 
:,,ince before 1920, when Erekson moved upon hi:,; prop-
erty, and its location hall Bever been questioned. He-
did not pursue the matter \Yith Erekson, but 
to satisfy Sieverts they obtained a quitclaim deed to the 
area hetween the deed line and fence line on the East of 
the subject property from George Ferguson and Edith 
Ferguson, his wife, and also chtained quitelaim deeds 
to the area between the South deed line and the South 
fence from Tad Aoki arnl Harriet Alpaugh 's estate, who 
were the owners to the South. Aoki was pun·hasing that 
under contract from Alpaugh. Respondents 
then brought this action against appellants for breach 
of the "covenants under the warranty deed", hut did not 
which of the five statutory covenants it claimed 
\Yere broken. The ease was tried before the Honorable 
Leonard vV. Elton, sitting "·ithout a jury, on "May 16, 
1969. The eourt coneluded that appellants brearhed the 
"covenants of title" under the warranty deed, (R.29) 
hut did not specify whieh covenant or covenants were 
hrnkE•n. The coul't found that "the as de-
scribed in the subject warranty deed did not eoincide 
with the fence lines on the subject property'', (R.20) 
and eoncluded that the 9th East frontage was l.93 feet 
<l0ficient, and that appellants had failed to deliver 
5 
''clear title'' to the tract. ( R.29) No damages were proved 
for the alleged 1.93 feet deficiency of frontage, and the 
court allowed no damages therefor. The only damage 
which the court allowed was $720.00 attorney's fees al-
legedly paid by respondents to their attorney for ''quiet-
ing title'', which presumably means obtaining the three 
quitclaim deeds heretofore mentioned and two satisfac-
tions of judgment against Aoki, which Aoki had paiu 
but had not been satisfied of record. No quiet title ac-
tion was ever brought by respondents against anyone. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
rrHERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 THAT THE 
''PROPERTY AS DESCRIBED IN THE SUBJECT 
WARRANTY DEED DID NOT COINCIDE WITH 
THE FENCE LINES ON THE SUBJECT PROP-
ERTY.'' 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT THE COMMENCEMENT POINT OF THE 
DESCRIPTION WAS IN LINE WITH THE OLD 
NORTH FENCE LINE, AND THAT THE NORTH 
LINE OF THE DESCRIPTION "'WAS ALONG THE 
OLD NORTH FENCE LINE. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
IN CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 THAT APPEJ,_ 
6 
BREACHED rrHE UOVENAN'r8 OF Tl11LE 
IN nu_; WARRANTY DEED THE PAR-
TIE1S. 
The above points will be treated together, since they 
all relate to the location of the cornrnencerneut point of 
the de:::>cription in the warranty deed from appellants to 
respondents. ·white the court nc spnciJic Jin<ling- :u 
to the location of the starting point, the court apparently 
toncluded that it began North of the old fence line in 
land possessed by Arion Erekson. Counsel uses the word 
"apparently" because Finding of Fact No. 8 seems to be 
i11 eonflioi with that conclusion. Finding of Fact No. 8 
states that the <lescriptiou \Vas "clear and unambiguous 
in its terms and conveyed the property which the defen-
dants intended to convey to plaintiffs". There never was 
any question but that all parties thought they were sell-
ing an<l lrnyiug the property within the fences. Respon-
dent Creas·on so testified. (R.58) Certainly the appel-
lants, Petersous, did not intend to sell property North 
of the O'ld fence they had never possessed. Arnt Petersou 
and his wife, Ruby Peterson, both testified that they had 
110 kuo\\'ledge that the North fence was not on the deed 
li11e. ( R.152, 164, 165) If the description conveyed the 
la ml the parties intended, then there certainly should 
not haYe been any judgment entered for the plaintiffs. 
Kor is there any evidence whieh justified the court 
below in concluding that there had been a breach of the 
covenants in the warranty deed. Sec. 57-1-12, U.C.A. 1953, 
p1•0,·ides that om statutory form of warranty deed con-
tnins five covenants, hut the lower court did not specify 
7 
\rhirh 'Ones it found broken. The only reference to cove-
nants is contained in Conclusion of Law No. 1 which 
reads: 
"Defendants breaehe<l co\·euants of title under 
the subject warranty deed <lated December 20, 
1963, in that they failed to deliver to plaintiffs 
the full street frontage of land described in said 
deed and wholly failed to cionvey a clear title to 
the tract conveyed thereby.'' 
A·s heretofore mentioned, 110 damage was proved be-
cause of the alleged 1.93 feet of frontage deficienry, and 
the court a warded no damages to respondents for such 
deficiency. There could be no damage because respon-
dents actually received 687 more square feet of land than 
their description called for, (R.143-144), and the pr·Op-
erty was not zoned commercial and was not sold by the 
front foot. (R.166-167) Respondents have not filed a 
eross-appeal from the judgment and thus that question 
(ff damages is not an issue before this eourt. That leaves 
only the matter of whether appellants failed to convey 
a "clear title". it is not specified wherein the title 
was not clear, presumably this Condusion of Law No. 1 
has reference to Finding of F'aet No. 5 that the fence 
lines and deed lines did not coincide. As will be herein-
after pointed out in Point IV of this argument, even if 
appe'llants did fail to eonny a elear title, it would not, 
without more, constitute a breach of any covenant since 
the grantee must he evicted by someone with paramount 
title who successfully asserts the same. That never oe-
rurred here. 
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Tlie only testirno11y adduced by respondents that the 
!·"nee ; nes and deed lines did not coincide came from 
i{olJert .J 011es, a surveyor employed Ly Bush & Uudgell. 
I le teslili.ed that Coon & King made a survey of the sub-
je<'l property 1,11 February 1 :Z, 1964, and prepared a 
plat, Kxhibit l'-4. lilr. Creason, one ·of the respondents, 
hrnught the plat to .Jo11es for him to eheek it. (H.13) 
,Jones did not personally go to the r:mbject pruperty to 
,·!Jeck it, ht1t seul a crew out \\'hid1 reported back to him 
that they [ouml a t\\'o aml a fraction foot error in Coc,11 
:'- l\:ing':,; lucalio11 of till' :-;tarti11g poiut Jones eontacted 
Charles of Cu:Jll & Ki11g, \\·ho reportedly sent his 
ne\1· lJ<ll·k Olli lo check it a11d :-;11bsta11tiated the 
error. (H.16) King appare11Hy agreed that he had erred 
aud preparetl a 11ew plat (Exhibit lo ref1ect the 
1·1HTectio11 of his error. 'l'he error was a mistake in meas-
uring Korth !U chai11s from the eenter of the intersec-
ti, n or .J(iOO South a11J 9th East. (R.S:Z) Because Jones 
nen•r personally we11t to the subjed property, every-
thi11g hL• testified to was based upon what his field ere\\. 
reported to him after they came baek. (R.79) He testi-
Jied that there had been set a County Surveyor's monu-
111e11 t in the il\,tersection (R.71) and he asswned that that 
rno11ument was used hy Coon & King both times they 
-;uneyed the subject property, but he was not positive. 
m.8:2) He thought his crew Uiied the Surveyor's 
mom1ment "as far as knuwledge goes" (R.S:J), but 
did not know for sure. (R79) 
'l'he location of the starting point of the fleseriptio11 
11 n s r ne of the issues at the trial. The acC'uracy of Exhihi t 
9 
P-3 an<l P-4 were questioned at the trial. (R.64, 73, 74) 
Yet no one from Coon & King testified at the trial as to 
their accuracy nor where they began to measure the 9.:2 
diains to the commencement P'Oint. Jones attempted to 
supply the missing testimony, but he had no first hand 
knowledge since he did not personally go to the subject 
property. He had only hearsay information supplied him 
by his field erew. The testimony of Jones was clearly i11-
rnfficient to support the ccurt 's Finding of Fact No. 8 
that the property as described in the subject warranty 
deed did not coincide with the fence lines on the subject 
property. 
On the other hand, appellants produced an abstract 
on the property, Exhibit D-7, showing that the descrip-
tion used by the parties was the same description used 
when appellants purchased the property in 1943. (Pg. 
28, Exhibit D-7) The starting point of this description 
is au ancient point, having appeared first in the deed 
from William Wootton, the patentee, to Joseph Thomp-
s·on in 1875. (Page 2 of UJbstract and copy of that deed 
inserted in end of abstract, Exhibit D-7). In each suc-
ceeding conveyance (Pages 3, 7, 8, 9, 13, 26, 28) there is 
reference to the point "9.2 chains North of the inter-
seetion of the icenter lines of 9th East and 56th South''. 
The same reference is found in the mortgages and other 
instruments at Pages 10, 14, 16, 20, 21, and 22. In every 
instance that point is designated as being in line with an 
old fence line, until 1943 when appellants purchased the 
subject property. In the conveyance to appellants there 
"-as no reference to the old fence line, presumably be-
10 
ca tlic de.,;eriptio11 was copied from au alJlireYiate<l 
LtX HoL,'<:. 'rhere is no evidence that the parties i11teu-
1101wily failed to refer to it as found in Finding of Fact 
l\eitlier party hm; enr elaimcd that. The evidenee 
is uncontr•overted that the old fence had remained intaet 
aml uudurnged for more than 4D year.,;, right down to the 
date of trial. Arion Erekson, who O\\·ns tl1e property to 
the X orth of the subject pruperty, testified that when he 
first moved to his property 011 April 15, 1D20, there wa.,; 
an old fence standing ( H.121) and that it still stands 
there in the same place (R.124), although it has been 
rebuilt several times. He was certain because the fence 
runs along a high ditch bank, which had also remained 
mwhanged since 1920. (R.134) Ruby Peterson, one of 
tlic appellants, likewise testified that she was now 58 
)"Cars of age; that when she was 10 or 11 years old she 
.!..'.all1ncd in the c(,\\·s for Alpaugh to milk; that the 
fence on the North side of the subjed property "went 
on the Korth side of the ditch exactly as it does today". 
(R.152) Mr. Peterson, her husband, testified that he had 
rc:,ii<led upon the subject property from 1943 to the date 
of sale to respondents; that the fence had been re-built 
lint along the same line as the old fence. (R.1G5) On cross-
examination he stated that because of the high ditch 
hank, "if you moved the fence you would luwe to 
it tPn foct either way". (R.169) 
'l'his fence line to which these three witnesses re-
Ccrrecl is the identical one to whieh thirteen successive 
references have been made in the chain of title as run-
ning North 89° F:ast 13.50 chains (891 feet) from 9th 
11 
East Street. Erekson testified it ran East about 900 feet 
from 9th East along his South boundary. (R.123) The 
fact that the fence line was not specifically mentioned in 
the description in the deed by which the appellants ac-
quired title in 1943, nor in the description in the deed 
from appellants to respondents in 1963, is inconsequen-
tial. At the time of both cionveyances the fence was there 
in the same place where it had stood unehanged since 
before 1920. Respondents did uot and could not produce 
any evidence that the fence had ever been moved. Re-
spondent Creason himself testified that it looked like an 
iold fence. (R.58) Certainly neither appellants nor re-
spondents intended to sell or buy any part of Erekson's 
property Nor th of the old fence. ( R.152, 164, 165) All 
the parties thought that the fence was the North boun-
dary of the subject property. Respondent Creason testi-
fied he thought he was buying the prcperty within the 
fence lines (R.58) The lower court erred in not holding 
that the starting point of the description was in line with 
the old fence line, and erred in not holding that the old 
North fence line constituted the North boundary of the 
property in law. This failure was error for several 
reasons. 
First, there were not in existence at the time of the 
Coon & King survey any monuments used in the original 
survey of the subject property, er any monuments of 
any succeeding surveys ·which might have been made, 
except for the old fence lines. A monument in the inter-
section of 9th East and 56th 1South was set by the County 
Surveyor in a1bout 1946 to 1948. (R. 126) This was three 
12 
year:o after appellant:,; ha<l pmdiase<l the pruperty iu 
1 :;4;), at which time they had had the property surveyed 
and 110 prcblem was fouud to exist. (R.151) Re::>pondents' 
witness, Robert Jones, who <lid not go to ur upon the 
subjeet property, but whose cre'v checked and found the 
t:nor of (;oon & King's HJG.J: survey (Exhibit P-4), did 
11ot personally lrnow whether Coon & Kiug· used thi::; 
monument as their starting point (H.82), nor <lid he 
per::;unally know whether his fiel<l crew nsecl that monu-
meu t Io chain fr um i11 checki11g the Uoon & King survey. 
( R .Jones further testified that his ('rew made no 
attempt to l1o('ate the center of tlie intersection by chain-
ing ". e:-;t l'rom the Southeast ('Orner d the X ortheast 
quarter of the quartl>r of Section 17 (herein-
after referred to as the lGth corner) as called for in the 
<les<·ription. ( K80) He further testified that many times 
"lie!i old mo11uments are attempted to Le re-established 
as the 011e here Het tlie Couut,v Surveyor, they 
do 110t agree ,yjth cl<l existing fence lines which were 
estalJliHhe<l in accordance \vith earlier surveys. (R.83) 
He a<'knowledged that in surveying it is proper to refer 
to earlier deeds in the ehaiu of ti11e to see if a call is made 
lo a fence, but that in this instance he did not have the 
lwuefit of the abstract. (R.89-90) .Jones acknowledged 
that the center of au intersecticn might change in the 
eomsc of 80 years and that his cletermination of where 
that point is toda:v would not 11eC'essarily he the same as 
ii \\'as in 187;'). (R.82) All agreed that they do 
not to lorate where a property line in law would he. 
(R.81, BG, H4) 
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Prior to l!:J46, there was no rnouument of any sort in 
the center of the intersection. 'l'here were road st·one8 at 
the four corners of the intersect.ion but these were set 
in 1896, 21 years after the first survey when Thompson 
purchased it from the patentee, \,Vootton. (R127) In 
view of this lack of 1original or even old monuments at 
either the intersection or at the 16th corner referred to 
in the description, other monuments must be looked to 
to locate the starting point ·of the subject property. 'fhe 
best and only evidence is the old fence line running along 
the North side of the subject property, which is referred 
to throughout the chain of •title and which has stood with-
out change since before 1920. Robert Goff, surveyor for 
appellants, testified that prior to the seHing of the road 
the only monuments were fences which vrnre set 
in accordance with early suneys. (R.127) 
Because original monuments become destroyed and 
surveyor's instruments become more exact and accurate, 
it is the duty of the surveyor when tracing an ancient 
descripti.on such as that used here, to follow the footsteps 
of the original surveyor who laid ·out the corners. ("1 ash-
ington Rock Co. v. Young, 29 U t. 109, 80 Pac. 382; 12 
Arn. J ur 2d, Sec. 61 ou Boundaries) This can be done 
giving effect to old fences which \rnre presumably estab-
lished in accordance with early surveys, and by giving 
effect t•o the nse and conduct of the landowners and their 
predecessors in title. In such eases the old fenee iotself 
is recognized as a controHing monument. Such was tile 
holding of this court in the case of Reese v. Murdock, 121 
Ut. 517, 243 P. 2d 948. That case involved the location of 
14 
Jlw. i;1rliug µoi11l of a lot lyi11g i11 tl11• Soutl1eac;t cornl'r 
\>f tbe 1:3 acre Thompson trad from \Yhic-h the subjl'et 
property was also earved. 'rhc beginning poiut was de-
seribed as the same 16th corner \\·hic-11 is l'ound in tl1l' 
description in the instant ease, to-wit, the Southeast c1Jr-
11er of the Northeast quarter of the North\YCst quarter 
111' 11. 111 that case t\V'O prin1te surn:·;ors placell 
1lie starting point 1:2 feet \Yest o[' an old fenC'e lim• and 
fence corner which had stood many years wi th1 ut qucs-
1 io11 ;is lhl' East honrnlar,\· of the property. The Co1mt:· 
Surveyior surveyed the property and established tl1c lw-
point :io feet \\"est of saicl old fcnee li11e. See the 
plat hclow . 
. 
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lt was contended in that case, as it is by respondents ii. 
this case, that one of the surveyed points of beginning 
must be adopted by the court as the point of beginning. 
This court rejected that contention holding that because 
the monuments of the original survey were gone and 
were lost, the next best evidenee of the starting point 
was the old fence line which presumably was built in ac-
cordance with an early survey. This court rejected all 
surveyed points of beginning and adopted the old fence 
line, which had been regarded by all 1owners as the East 
boundary of the property. 
tiaid this court, 
"The evidence of where that point (beginning 
point) was according to the original survey es-
tablishing that point or as re-establishing it is 
very uncertain. There is evidence that this fente 
line has marked the Eastern boundary of this 
property which has been held without dispute by 
the predecessors of plaintiffs and defendants for 
more than 50 years .... There are no monuments 
on the ground which indicate where the starting 
point was located either by the original or the 
re-established survey except this old fence .... All 
of the parties concerned in purchasing· this prop-
erty understood that this fence line was the East-
ern boundary line of the property." 
The instant case is even stronger on its facts for 
application of the rule of Reese v. l\f urdock because (1) 
in Reese v. Murdock there was never any reference in 
the chain of title to the starting p·oint and East boundary 
line as beiing on a fence line, whereas, in the instant case 
there are no less than thirteen references in the abstract 
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from 18'i.) to 1943 to the old fence line as being the Nor th 
boundary, and (2) the fence line adopted by the court 
in Heese v . .Murdock was 12 feet to 30 feet outside and 
beyond the surveyed deed line, whereas, in the instant 
case the fence line is 4.5 feet within the surveyed line. 
As early as 1905, this court in W ashinglion Rock Co. 
v. 1 oung, 29 Ut. 108, 118, 80 Pac. 382, stated," The law is 
well settled that an original survey of lands, upon the 
fate of which property rights have been based and ac-
quired, contnols over surveys subsequently made which 
injuriously affect such rig·hts' '. It quoted with approval 
from Hess v. Meyer, 73 Mich. 259, 41 NW 422, wherein 
it was said, "If the stakes or monuments placed by the 
government in making the survey to indicate the section 
eorners and quarter posts can be found, or the places 
where they >Originally were placed can be identified, they 
are to control in all cases. When they cannot be found, 
or if lost or ohliterated, they must be restored upon the 
vest evidence obtainable which tends to prove where they 
originally were. For this purpose surveys are made and 
lines re-traced as near as possible". (Italics added). 
This court then went on to state, 
"In such ca,ses junior or subsequent surveys 
are not made to dispute the eorrectness of or to 
eontrol the original but to furnish legiti-
mate proof of where the lost lines or monuments 
were so as to aid the jury in determining the 
exad lo,cation of the original survey. It seems 
clear, therefore, that in making such junior sur-
veys the original survey should be re-traced, 
where possible .... An original survey upon which 
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vroperty rights have been acquired, cannot thus 
be changed or diminished or obliterated, w! th so 
little regard for existing evidence." 
The decisions of this court in Heese v . .Murdock and 
\Yashington Rock Co. v. Young are in accordance with 
well recognized law on this point. In 12 Am. Jur 2d on 
Boundaries, Sec. Gl, entitled ''Resurveys'', it is written: 
''In surveying a tract of land according to a 
former plat or survey, the surveyor '·s ·only duty 
is to relocate, upon the best evidence obtainable, 
the courses and lines at the same place where 
originally located by the first surveyor on the 
ground. In making the survey, he has the right 
to use the notes of the original survey. The object 
of a resurvey is to furnish proof of the location of 
the lo-st lines or monuments, not to dispute the 
0orrectness of or to control the original survey. 
The original survey in all cases must, whenever 
possible, be retraced, since it cannot be disre-
garded or needlessly altered after property rights 
have been acquired in reliance upon it. On a re-
survey to establi1sh lost boundaries, if the original 
corners can he found, the places where they were 
originally established are conclusive without re-
gard to whether they were in fact correctly located, 
in this respect it has been stated that the rule is 
based on the premise that the stability of boun-
dary lines i·s more important than minor inaccura-
cies or mistakes. But it has also been said that 
great eaution must be nsed in reference to resur-
veys, since surveys made hy different surveyors 
seldom wholly agree. A resurvey not shown to 
have been based upon the original survey is in-
conclusive in determining boundaries and will 
ordinarily yieild to a resurvey based upon known 
18 
monuments and boundaries of the original sur-
vey''. 
111 the irn;taut case the trial eourt disregarded the 
best aml only ev;idence obtainable as to the original loca-
tion of tlie starting point and the North boundary of the 
subject p1ioperty. Although he made no finding as to the 
location of the starting point of the property, nor made 
any finding as to the location of the North line of the sub-
ject property, and refused to do so when such omission 
wat'i called to his attention in appellants' Motion to 
.\mend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (R.32) 
J1c apparently coneluded that the surveyed line over in 
Erckson 's property was the North line of the subject 
µruperty, sinec in Finding of Fact No. 5 he found, "that 
I lie property deseribed in the subject warranty deed did 
not coincide with the fence lines on the subject prop-
erty''. 
Had he used the old fenee as the starting point and 
the North line, the fences would then coincide with the 
deed lines except on the East and Southeast where the 
fonr'e:-; took in too much footage ... all to the benefit of 
the respondents. In this regard appellants call attention 
to the text of 8eotion il, entitled "Ancient Fences", 12 
Am .. Jud. 2d on Boundaries. There is stated in part: 
'' Ancieut fern·es used by a surveyor in his at-
tern pt tn reproduce an old survey are strong evi-
denee of the location of the original lines and, if 
theY have been standing for rnanv Years, should 
lw ·taken as indicating 'sneh lines. against the 
evidence of a survev which ignores such fences 
nnd is lrnsed npon a·n assumed starting point. It 
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is said that a long estaulished fence is betfor e•:: 
dence of actual boundaries settled by practical 
location than any surveys made after the monu-
ments of the original survey have disappeared. 
Accordingly, a fence erected on a surveyed line 
shortly after the land has been surveyed may 
serve as a monument to control courses and dis-
tances or a subsequent survey after the stakes set 
out ai the time of the original survey have dis-
appeared.'' 
'rhe text cites the following cases in support: F. H. 
\Volf Brick Company v. Lonyo, 132 .Mich. 162, 93 N". 
231, and Wacker v. Price, ( 1950) 70 Ariz. 99, 216 P. 2d 
707. 
In the \Vacker case just cited, the court quoited in ib 
opinion with approval from 110 Am. St. Rep. 681, under 
the title of "Resurveys and Their Purpose and Effect": 
"In Diehl v . .Z.anger, 39 :.Mich. 601, where the 
first survey of lots involved in litigation was 
made by one Campau, and a resurvey made years 
afterward by the City Surveyor showed that the 
practical location of the whole plat was wrong, it 
was declared that a resurvey made after the dis-
appearance of the monuments of the original 
survey is for the purpose of determining where 
they were, and not where they should have been, 
an<l that a long established fence is hetter eYi-
dnce of actual boundaries settled by pradieal lo-
eation than any survey made after the monuments 
of the original survey have disappeared. 'Nothing 
is better understood', said Justice Cooley in de-
livering the opinion of the court, 'than that few 
of our early plats will stand the test of a careful 
and aecurate survey without disclosing- errors. 
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·fl1is is true of the government surveys as well 
as any others, and if all the lines were now subject 
to correction on new surveys, the confusion uf 
lines and titles that would follow would be simply 
incalculable and the visitation of the surveyor 
might well he set down as a great public calamity. 
But no law can sanction this course. The City 
8urveyor has mistaken entirely the point to which 
his attention should have directed. The question 
is not how an entirely accurate survey would lo-
cate these lots, hut how the origi.nai stake·s lo-
cated them .... The City Surveyor should, there-
fore, have directed his attention to the ascertain-
ing of the actual location of the original land-
marks set by Mr. Campau, and when those were 
discovered they must govern. If they are no 
longer discoverable, the question is where they 
were located; and upon that question the best 
possible evidence is usually found in the practical 
location of the lines made at a time when the 
oriµ;inal monuments were presumably in existence 
nnd probably known. Stewart v. Carlton, 31 Mich. 
:270. As between old boundary f enees, and any 
survey made after the monuments have disap-
peared, the fences are far the better evidence of 
what t11e lines of the location actually are'." 
'l'he Arizona court stated, "that it is a matter of 
rnmmon knowledge that the great majority of original 
surveys are more or less inaccurate, and since it has al-
\Yays been the rule that courts must resort and be bound 
hy the best evidence available, it follows that the boun-
daries fixed by the property owners themselves in the 
absenre of the inability of surveyors to definiiely fix the 
monuments fr1Qm which the original survey was made, 
must control ... ". 
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ln a coucurring opmwn rn the Wacker case, Judge 
Phelps stated that in the absence of 1110numents l'rom 
which the original survey was made, the fences along 
the sidelines of the lot themselyes may be treated 
monuments. 
'l'here is an additional reason \Yhy the court should 
have found the North boundary of the subject property 
to be the old fenee line. The starting point is <lesnibc<l 
as, "Beginning in the center of 9th East Street, X orth 
9.:2 ehains from the intersection of the center lines of 9th 
East Street and :->Gth South Street, :,;aid point being 1::3.23 
chains vYest and 9.:2 ehains or1h from the 
<'Orner of the Northeast quarter of the K orthwest quar-
ter of Section 17' '. Douglas Brammer, Chief Deputy i11 
the Salt Lake County Surveyor's Office, testified that 
this beginning point left "s-0me question" a:,; to how you 
arrive at it. (R. 141) To illustrate thi:,; doubt, he made a 
drawing, Exhibit D-G, which shows that starting at the 
1 Gth eorner and coming true "'est 13.:2;) <'ha ins, yon 
would arrive approximately 10.9 feet South of the center 
of tlw intersection as it is :,;hown 011 the eonnty referem·t· 
plat. (R.142-143) However, if you came on the bearing 
of North 89°17'35" West along the center of 56th South, 
would arrive at the center of the intersection as it 
rxists today. Thus, a doubt is raised as to \Yhat is in-
tended by the description hecansc it can he interpreted 
two different ways. (R.14-7-148) the' 16th line 
nor the center of 56th South runs true East and West 
(R.148); yet the description as contained in early deeds 
(Pages 2, 3, 7 anrl 8 of ahstrad state: "Thence true "West 
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a1oug the centre of County Road on South line of said 
fody Thirte\.:n Chains Twenty Five Links (13.25) ". 
1 ltalics ad<le<l) Hobert Uoff, a licensed surveyor called 
to testify by the appellants, corroborated .Jilr. Brammer 
and testified that the center of 56th .-::;outh and the 16th 
line do not coincide or even parallel each other. (R.129) 
Ile te:,;tified that at 13th East, the 16th line was in the 
North half of 56th South Street, but that at Vine Street 
( 750 East) the 16th line is in the South half of that street, 
and that :,;omewhere between those two points the two 
lines cr'oss each other. He further testified that the sur-
vey plat of Cook & King, Exhibit P-3, suggests to him 
that a point South of the present center of the intersec-
tions of the two streets was used when the fences were 
put in. (R.130) He further testified that it should be 
assumed that fences which are established have been 
'urrnye<l in their location, (R.137) and that survey lines 
are not 11ecessarily legal property lines, (R.136) and that 
prior to the setting of the roadstones at the four corners 
1,f the intersection on 14, 1896, the only monu-
ments \\·ere fences which were set in accordance with 
(R.127) 
To say the least, the starting point contained in the 
warranty deed was ambiguous and pri<>r deeds 
in the c-hain of title should be looked to to clear up the 
ambiguity. In Sec. 100-h on Deeds, 26 CJS, Page 874, it 
i:;; stated: 
"It has been held or recognized that, where the 
trrms of a <lee<l are amhiguons or uncrrtain in 
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<lescribing land conveyed, a prior deed in the 
chain of title may be looked to to secure the trl.e 
description", 
eiting Jones v. Johnson, 305 Ky. 325, 204 8. \\'. 2d %1, 
which held that an omission in a subsequent description 
cannot enlarge the boundaries of land conveyed by dee<l. 
If prior deeds in this chain of title are looked to to secure 
the true description, we find on 13 occasions the call to 
the old North fence line which firmly fixes the North 
houndary of the subject property. Because the deed to 
rnspondents faile<l to mention it did not authorize the 
trial court to disregard the fence and enlarge the de-
sCJ·iptiou. The lower court erred in disregarding this 
an<'icnt monument. It failed to recognize the best evi-
dence of the existence of the starting point and North 
bouncla ry of the subject property, viz., the old North 
fonec line which had been referred to in deeds since 1875, 
n ml which when followed gave the respondents 687 more 
square feet than their description actually ealled for. 
The i·espondents themselves recognized this when they 
did not pursue Erekson but adopted the fence line, 
thcrel)y getting more square footage than had the deed 
lines been followed. No outsider made any claim to the 
property within the fences, and no one ever disturbed 
respondents' possession. If there was any error with the 
fence lines it was not with the North fence but with the 
East and South fence which encompassed more area 
than they should have. This was all to the benefit of the 
respondents who received more land than they had ac-
tually bargained for. No covenant is broken when the 
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iPJlf'.es e1.r,oiupas8 tou much ground, as the grantees <:an 
:::.,·ic.11:-:ly nHn·e the fences hack. 
POINT IV. 
'rHE LOWER COUHT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
'rHERE \VA8 A BREACH OF WARRANTY BE-
CAU8E 'rlIE 'l'ITLE \\'A8 NOT CLEAR. 
Although the trial court did not specify which cove-
nant or covenants it found to have been broken, it stated 
iu Conclusion of Law No. 1 that appellants breached the 
eove11ant8 of title because they had ''failed to convey a 
dear title". (H.29) This would indicate that the court 
thought that the covenants for quiet enjoyment and of 
1rnrranty were broken. If this was the court's conclusion, 
it \\'as erroneous because they are not broken merely by 
the existence of au unclear or clouded title. These cove-
uauts are uot broken until the grantee is evicted, either 
actually or eoustructively, by someone with a superior 
or paramount title. Sec. 57-1-12, U.C.A. 1953, provides 
the following with respect to the use of our statutory 
form of warranty deed: 
'' 8uch deed when executed as required by law 
shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple 
to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the prem-
ises therein named, together with all the appur-
tenances, rights and privileges thereunto belong-
ing, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs 
and personal representatives, that he is lawfully 
seized of the premises; that he has good right to 
convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, 
11is heirs and assigns in the quiet possession 
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thereof; that tlie premises are free from ;111 
cumbrances; an<l that the grantor, hi::; heirs and 
personal representatives will forever warrant 
and defend the title thereof in the grantee, hi, 
heirs a11d assigns, agai11.sf all lawful claims zchat-
.suci·er. Any exceptions to sud1 covenants may be 
hricfiy insertc<l in such deed following the descrip-
tion of the land". (Italics added) 
1t shc.ulJ he 11otcll that the above section 
upon the granior the duty of forever warranting allll 
<lefendiug the title i11 the grantee agaiust all la·w/ul 
claims. lt does 11ut say that tl1e grantor will warrant awl 
defend against auy claim or against unlawful claims. 111 
Sc<". 101J, Tiffany on Real Property, the author states: 
''Covenants f1or quiet enjoyment and of war-
ranty are equivalent. They are broken only \\-he11 
the disturban('c of the grantee's enjoyment is hy 
the grant or or by a third person under lawful 
claim of title". 
Iu the same work in Sec. 1013, it is stated: 
"In order for there to be a breach of warrant)· 
or of quiet enjoyment by reason of a paramuunt 
title in another, an eviction of the covcnantee by 
such other is ordinarily necessary. Tile existence 
of an invalid an<l unenforceable claim is not a 
breach, even th1.ug-h it c·onstitut0 a cloud 011 
the title". 
This court in Baumgarten v. Chipman, 30 Utah 4G6. 
8G Pac. 411, held that in an action fur hreaeh of covenant 
of warrant;\·, the grantee must show that he \\"HS evicted 
from the land conveyed by someone with a paramount 
title and that the grantor had notice of that snit so that 
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l:r h:Jcl an opportunity to be heard on the question of 
wlle1 her his title or the other party's title was para-
mount. 
the above law to the instant case, the re-
contended in thP lower court that there had 
been a breach of covenant:,; because a strip, 4.5 feet in 
1ridth lying Korth cf the old North fence line, was in the 
posses:-;ion of Arion ]i;rekson. As had been pointed out 
under Points l, II, and 111 in this brief, appellants have 
demom;trnted that the deseription for the 89 years prior 
lo the respundents' purchase had never been construed 
1o iuelude any land North of the fence line, and should 
nut now be so construed. However, if this court does not 
aµ,reP "·ith appellants in that regard, then the question of 
111rnend1ip of the strip Lecomes important. Appellants 
rnay \\ell own said strip if it lie::; within their description 
8iJH'e tl1(•y and their predecessors liave been paying taxes 
on it though Erekson and his predecessors have 
lieeu i11 possession. Appellants do not admit and have 
11e\'Pr admitted that Erekson has paramount title to the 
,,trip. 'I'he question of ownership has never been deter-
mined either in this action or any prior action because 
re8poudents chose not to pursue it. But before being sad-
dled with liability for breach of warranty, appellants 
1·ertai11l:'' want an opportunity for a day in court when it 
i::J judicially determined who is the owner. Until, how-
1·1·er, there is a determination adverse to the title 0on-
\'eyed, respondents have no cause of action against 
appellants on the covenants of warranty. Such adverse 
drtPrmination was require<l of the grantee, Van C10tt, in 
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the case of Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 LT tah 412, 226 Pac. 460. 
There, it first had been detennined in a suit \"aii 
Cott and Casper, an adjoining owner, that Casper ha<l 
the paramount title to the strip there in questi1 11 which 
had been conveyed to Van Cott. See Van Cott v. Cas-
per, 53 Utah 161, 176 Pac. 849. Thereafter, Vau Cott 
lwought an action against hi:,; grantor, Jacklin, for breach 
of warranty. This court required .Jacklin to indemnify 
Van Cott for damages sustained in view of the prior 
unsuccessful suit with Casper. Hau Van Cott won the 
suit against Ca8per, Van Cott would have had no eause 
of action against Jacklin because 110 <"ovewrnt would 
have been broken. 
Respondents are, therefon•, premature in hringing 
suit against their grantors, the appellants, fer hreacb 
of covenants. They have had no litigation with Erekson 
who they now assert has paramount title to the 4.5 foot 
strip. Until Erekson's paramount title has been judi-
cially determined, they have no eause of adion agaimt 
appellants. As stated by the above authorities, the exis-
tence of an invalid and unenforceable claim is not a 
breach, even though it may cloud the title. The statement 
in Conclusion of Law No. 1 that there was a breach of 
warranty because the title was not clear is a legal non 
sequitur. 
If the lower court concluded that the covenant against 
encumbrances was broken, it was in error since thi;; 
eourt in the case of Utah Savings & Trust v. Stoutt, :36 
Utah 212, 102 Pac. 865, held that such coYenant contern-
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platP that there must be a lien or rnlid elaim against 
1he property. The mere assertion of a claim is not 
1·11ough, and umnarketability of title is not encugh. 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S J;,EES IXCURRED 
fK OBTAINING QUITCLAIM DEEDS F'ROl\l AD-
.JOINING OWNERS ON THE SOUTH AND EAST. 
The only damages awarded respondents in this action 
were $720.00 for attorney's fees in "quieting title". 
(Finding of :B'act No. 7, R.28) Since they did not bring 
llll.Y quiet title action, this finding presumably means 
obtaining the three quitclaim deeds and the two satis-
faetiiom; of judgment from adjoining owners. Appellants 
have heretofore pointed out in this brief under Points 
1. II, and III that there were no encumbrances or clouds 
on the title and it is, therefore, our position that there 
waR no need to obtain the quitclaim deeds. Assuming, 
however, that there were clouds on the title, no cases 
hllve been found where 3Jttorney 's fees were allowed a 
grautel'-eovenantee for dearing clouds. In fact, the 
authorities are unanimous that attorney's fees will not 
he allowed in such instances. In 20 Am. ,J ur. 2d, Ser. 151 
on Covenants, Page 710, it is stated: 
"Thus sinee a C'ovenant of warranty does not 
protect against every unfounded adverse elaim 
hut is broken onlv where there is actual or con-
structive eviction. under a paramount title, thP 
covenantee is not entitled to demand of his cov-
enantor expenses incurred in the defense of a suit 
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which sustains the title a::; valid. The fact that 
there is an apµare11t cloud upon the title is 11 u1 
enough, but its ualidity inust be shown to cstaf;lis/i 
the Lrnr rant or's liability. " (Italic::; added) 
ln an annotation on this subject at Gl A.L.H. lGU, the 
same rule is stated, viz. that attorney's fees incunc<l in 
remo\·ing douds from the title are not chargeaLle against 
the grant or in an Lasetl upon breach of covenants: 
··A eonmaut i::; a coutrad of iu<lcmnity 
lu8::; hecau::;e of a defective title, and uot a oon-
tract to indemnify the covenantee against 
from the unfounded assertion of claims against 
the title; hence, auy expenditures in defending 
the title agai1rnt su('h claims cannot be recovered 
for on the g1iound of liability under the covenanb 
(citing Hoffman v. Dickson, G5 \\'ash. 556, 118 
Pac. 737, and Smith v. Parsons, 3:J \\'.Ya. ()44, 11 
S.E. 68). Under a warranty extending fo lawful 
claims o itly, expe,11ses incurred -in def endiu,ry 
a9ainst a11 unfounded claim cannot be reco·vered 
from those bound by the warranty. The fact that 
there is an appare11t cloud upon the title is 1101 
enough. Its validity must be showu to establish 
the liability of the u;arrantor. (Citing '" 
Clark, 80 N.ll. 577, 120 Atlan. 433). So where 
there are clouds upon the covenantee 's titie, 
which in order to give him an unembarrassed title 
it is necessary to ha\'e removed, and he accord-
ingly files a bill to remove such outstanding claims 
as clouds upon his title, if he is successful therein 
he is not entitled to recover the ('r;sts mid expense; 
of the suit and damag-es for the breach of cove· 
nant either of seisin or of warranty since such 
claims haYing been adjudicated faYorably to the 
coYenantee, do not constitute a hrcaeh of snrh 
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eo en au ts. (Citing Luther v. Brown, GG 
Appeal 227)" (Italics added) 
Uur statule, 8ec. 37-1-12, U.C.A. 1933, codifies the 
rnle above stated by those authorities wherein it fixes 
the liability of a grantor in a warranty deed as follows: 
" ... and that the grantor ... will forever 
warrant and defend the title thereof in the gran-
tee ... agaiust all lawful claims whatsoever". 
(Italics added) 
lll this action the attorney's fees were incurred in 
ulitaiuiug quitdaim deeds from the adjoining owners on 
the East, George and 1£dith Ferguson, and quitclaim 
Jeeds au<l two safo;factions of judgment from the ad-
joi11i11g uwuer::; 011 the South, the Estate of Harriet 
Alpaugh, deceased, and Tad Aoki, her contract pur-
diat:>el'. K Cll1e d these landowners had ever made any 
l'laim tu the subject property, let aloue any lawful claim 
1d1ich 8ec. 57-1-12 requires. There has never been any 
aclju<lica tiuu or determination in this action or any other 
adiun that any of these adjoining owners had as much 
col:1r of title to any part of the subject property, let 
alo11e the paramount title which our statute requires 
before imposing liability on the grantor. Gerald Creason, 
ouc of the re8poudents, admitted that uo one had dis-
turbed his possessicu in any way or made any claim to 
aay of the property within the fern·es. (R.71) Indeed, 
!he adjoining owners on the South, the Estate of Harriet 
.\Jpangli, dceea8ed, was the appellant8' grantor and it 
1·oulcl not legally make any claim to property which she 
had c·onveyed to them in 1943 by warranty deed, aml 
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which ;;arne pn,1rnrty appellant;; haJ eonveyeJ to resp 011 
Jents iu lUG;J. ln any rnse of conilict between the twu 
tracts of lawl, the title to the wuject prnperty woul<l ()[ 
neces;;ity be paramount to the tract 011 the South whitli 
;;he retaineJ. On the l!}ast, the true deed line according 
to re;;pondeub' L,\vn ;;urveyor, was to 3 feet im;ide the 
fence line, ;,;o there \ms no problem there. (Exh. l'-:JJ 
But e\-ell if one of the adjoining landowner;,; had madl 
;;ome claim to a portivn of the sul>ject property and had 
hrcught suit tu quiet title tu that portion, and the respo11-
<lent;; were required to <lefeml 8UCh action, re8pon<len1, 
(·ould not reco,·er attorney's fees under the covewrnb 
uules8 their defense of sneh quiet title aetion ,,·as u11suc· 
<·essful arnl t lie adjoiuing owner ;;ncl'ceded in obtainini: 
part of the 8nhject property by being able tu prove thal 
title \vas paramount. 
How, then, could the lower court a ward re8pondenl' 
attorney's fees for "clearing clouds" by obtaining quit-
claim deeds, when it could not have given them attorney's 
fee8 fer su<:ce8;;fully defending a quiet title action'! 
61 A.L.R 169, supra. Only when an adjoining owner with 
a paramount title takes part of the laud conveyed to the 
grantee away from him can he he heard to <'omplain anJ 
recover from his grantor attorney's fees incn rred in th1· 
u11sm·cessful defense of the title conveyed. So held thi' 
r'ourt in Yan Cott v. Jacklin, l1tah 412, 226 Pac. 460 
Furthermore, the attack on the title must he a direct 
attack. It is insufficient that the title is found unmarkel· 
ahle. 61 A.L.R. 169; Hilliker v. Rueg-er, 228 N.Y. 11, 120 
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.\.K 2!jC; Hoffman v. Dickson, 65 Wash. 53G, 118 Pac. 
:20 A: L J ur. :2d, Sec. 150 on Uovenants. 
There has l1ee11, of course, no determination or adju-
Jic;atiou that any of the adjoining owners from whom the 
4uitdaim deeds were acquired had paramount title. Re-
spomlents' counsel in the trial court admitted in a 
iucmorandum written by him that none of the owners 
on the Nouth or East "asserted a11y lawful claims" and 
that ''it is ·obvious that no11e of the adjoining owners to 
the East and South had title paramount to plaintiffs 
[rec:pornle11ts] ''. (R.42) He further cunceded: 
.. J>laiutiffs agree that attorney's fees should 
not Lie allowed with respect to unlawful claims 
and thus, efforts to vbtain land to the South and 
East are not properly includable as damages in 
a hreaeh of warranty aetion''. (R.41) 
In that memorandum he sought to justify the award 
of fees 011 the ground that Ereksou had title to the 4.5 
loot strip i\mth of the ol.cl fence line. We have already 
pointed L;Ut iu Point IV of this brief that respondents 
ca1111ot maintain an action for breach of covenants until 
the!' have determined that question with Erekson. 
But even if eounsel were correct that Erekson had title 
to part of the land conveyed by appellants to respon-
the attorney's fees \Yere incurred in obtaining 
qniklaim deeds from the owners to the South and East, 
am] "ere not incurred in litigating or even negotiating 
with E;reksou. Counsel for respondents testified at the 
trial (R.112) that he probably spent "five minutes" in 
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llealing with 1'.:rekt:wn. 'l'hus, \\'hether Ereks'Jll h<>rl pai: 
mount title ur not tu the strip orth of the fenee, respon 
dents spent 110 time or money in attempting to obtaii1 
possession uf it. 'l'hey would Le entitled to n'Othing more 
than nominal damages. In the court below, 
relie<l upon the case of Van Cott \'.Jacklin, supra. There, 
the fees awar<le<l to the grantee had been incurred bi 
him in a prior unsuccessful lawsuit with one Casper, au 
adj1oini11g owner, to obtain possession of part of the laud 
conveyed to the grantee. lt was adjudicated in that suil 
between Van Cott and Casper, that Casper had the 
paramount title. See Yan Cott v. Casper, 5;3 Utah 161. 
llli Pae. 849. Therefore, in the subsequent aetion broughl 
by Yau Cott against his grautor, J ackliu, this court re-
quired Jacklin to indemnify his grantee fur the attor-
ney's fees incurred in the unsuecessful suit with Casper. 
The Van Cott v. Jaeklin rule has 11'0 applieation Len 
because respondents have had no litigation with Erekso11 
who they elaimed had paramount title to 4.5 feet of land 
conveyed to them l>y appeHants, and admitted to spend-
ing only "five minutes" in approaehing him. Instead. 
they took the laud enelosed by fences South of the old 
North fence (thereby picking up G87 square feet more 
than they had bargained for), but yet in this action were 
awarded attorney's fees incurred in obtaining quitclaim 
deeds from people who they admit did not have parn 
mount title, (H.42) and in face of their counsel's con· 
cession that "efforts to obtain land to the South and 
East are not properly includable as damages in a hreacn 
of warranty action". ( R.41) 
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l it'arly, there is uo basis for the award of attorney's 
lees in th is action by the trial court to respondents. 
POINT VI. 
'fHJ:: AWARD UF $7:20.00 AT'l'ORNEY'S l!'EES 
\\'AS EXCE81SIYE AND UKREASONABLE. 
Respondents' eouusel at the trial testified of his time 
and efforts iu behalf of his clients. He said it added up to 
SO homs of work (R.103) He multiplied it by his hourly 
rate and came up with $750.00 in fees. (R.104) The court 
awarded him $720.00. Appellants believe, of course, that 
there has been no breach of covenants and no amount 
uf attorney's fees should have been awarded. In the 
e\·ent, howeYer, this court determines that respondnts 
are entitled to attorney's fees, we believe $720.00 was 
rxcessive for his efforts in "clearing the title", which 
notl1ing more than obtaining three quitclaim deeds 
and two satisfactions of judgment. (R.113) We do not 
U.oubt that counsel expended 80 hours in behalf of his 
dients. Most of his time, however, was spent in connec-
tiou with respondents' sale of the subject property to 
the Sievert Brothers and in pursuit of other matters not 
related to "C'lcaring the title", and for which appellants 
('OUltl not be charged. For exampile, at R.93 he testified, 
"T neg-otiated at some length with :Mr. Vuyk on behalf 
of the contract purchasers. "\Ye exchanged a number of 
letters, many, many telephone eonYersations ". Again, at 
R.9i he testified, "I obtained a quitclaim deed from Mr. 
Creason and his wife in favor of the Hallmark Construc-
t on;, which had been the contract seller to the Sieverts, 
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tu remo\'e that question''. Again, at R.91' he 
l 
'' l prepared a warranty deed for the signature of Mr. 
and Mrs. Creason and Hallmark Constructor1>, Iuc., c 
Utah corporation", which deed was in favor of the 
vert Brothers. His testimony on direct examination wa, 
replete with reforenees to matters which he pursued fur 
his elients, which had nothing to do with "elearing the 
title" ..... are not liable for his time in dealiu" e 
with the Sievert Brothers, in eorresponding with and 
telephoning their attorneys, in preparing quitclaim deeds 
for Mr. and ..\lrs. Creason to convey the property to Hall-
mark Constructors, or for preparing a warranty <lee<l 
from Mr. and Mrs. Creason and Hallmark Constructor, 
to the Sievert Brothers. At R.94 he testified that it 
18 months after he was engaged by Mr. Creason that he 
prepared the quiklaim deeds whieh were to be signed by 
..\Irs. Alpaugh and 1\lr. Aoki, owners to the 8'outh. He 
asserted that the great majority of his time was spent in 
tloing the title work, obtaining surveys and ascertaining 
who had judgments on the property. (R.113) Yet when 
probed un cross-examination he admitted, however, he 
had a title eomµauy 1>earch the records and giYe him a 
preliminary title report; that he personally did not have · 
to search any reeords; that Bush & Gudgell, surveyors, 
provided him with legal descriptions to use in the quit-
claim deeds; that thereafter it was largely a secretarial 
task in preparing the three deeds; (R.113) that the two 
deeds for Alpaugh and Aoki were mailed to appellants' 
<'ounsel (R.107), who returned the Alpaugh deed signed 
(R.108), and who delivered the other deed to Aoki. 
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\ ! 1 ·5) 1 hat he had to walk over the ground with Aoki 
explain it to him before he would sign. (R.114) He 
i'urlher testified he euuld not liave spent more than one 
hour dealing with the Fergusons, owners on the East, or 
preparing quitelaim deeds for their signatures. (R.112) 
Ile spent five minutes with Arion Erekson. (R.112) 
lt is obvious from his testimony that very little of 
the 1-!U hours time was spent in preparing and obtaining 
on the three quitclaim deeds which he claimed 
were necessary to clear the title. (He did not include any 
time for serviees rendered in the instant breach of war-
ranty law suit (R.115), which, of course, he could not 
.-.incc attorney's fees for bringing a breach of \Varranty 
acti•o11 arc not recoverable from the grantor. Van Cott 
1· .• J aeklin, :rnpra.) To impose $7:20.00 upon the appellants 
for his serviees in obtaining the quitclaim deeds and 
satisfactions of judgment is unreasonable. From his 
own testimony it is difficult to see how he could have 
expewled more than 25 hours in meaningful work reas-
related to "clearing the title". At his hourly rate 
of $10.00 (R.104) that would g1.ve him $250.00. Had he 
brought a quiet title action against the adjoining owners, 
the recommended fee by the Utah Bar Association is 
as set forth in the Utah State Bar advisory hand-
book on offi('e management ancl fees. His time in obtain-
ing tl1e quitclaim deed from Ferguson is not properly 
assessahle against the appellants heeause the strip aC'-
quired from Fergm;on was beyond the deed line and by 
no strf'teli of the imagination C'an appellants be respon-
,;ihle for attempts t.o secure land in excess of that actually 
desnihe<l in the deed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Hespondents received title an<l possession to tbe for 
they intended to purchase and pleasantly found it.I 
fences encompassed a greater area than they had bar-
gained fur. No outsider made any claim to any part of 
it, but because a surveyor using modern instruments and 
apparently measuring from a recently established monu-
ment, questioned by a few feet the location of the North 
line, respondents disregarded 88 years of practical loca-
tion and set on a course leading to the unnecessary ex-
penditure of their time and money. They erroneously 
concluded that they should have a strip possessed by 
Erekson, but without pursuing tliat matter to a conclu-
sion with him, they prematurely filed this action for 
breach of warranty against their grantors. They han 
failed to establish a breach of warranty and have totally 
failed to show that they expended any attorney's 
in the unsuccessful defense of the title conveyed. The· 
juggment entered below cannot stand on the facts or the 
law. It should be reversed and appellants awarded their 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD C. HOWE 
5055 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
38 
